We present two embeddings of Lukasiewicz logic L into Meyer and Slaney's Abelian logic A, the logic of lattice-ordered Abelian groups. We give new analytic proof systems for A and use the embeddings to derive corresponding systems for L. These include hypersequent calculi, terminating hypersequent calculi, co-NP labeled sequent calculi, and unlabeled sequent calculi.
INTRODUCTION
Hájek [1998] classified truth-functional fuzzy logics as logics whose conjunction and implication connectives are interpreted by continuous t-norms and their residua. 1 Since each continuous t-norm may be constructed using ordinal sums from the Lukasiewicz, Gödel, and Product t-norms, the resulting logics, Lukasiewicz logic L, Gödel logic G, and Product logic , are fundamental to this classification. Also important are Hájek's Basic Logic BL [Hájek 1998 ], shown in Cignoli et al. [2000] to characterize validity in logics based on continuous t-norms, and Godo and Esteva's Monoidal t-norm-based logics MTL and IMTL [Esteva and Godo 2001] , shown in Jenei and Montagna [2002] and Esteva et al. [2002] to characterize validity in logics based on left-continuous t-norms and left-continuous t-norms with an involutive negation, respectively. Underlying all the above is Höhle's [1995] monoidal logic ML, which provides a common basis for t-norm-based logics and logics based on Heyting algebras. A diagram showing the relationships between these and some other well-known logics (with arrows signifying inclusions) is given in Figure 1 .
Systematic axiomatic and algebraic presentations of fuzzy logics have been provided in, for example, Hájek [1998] and Gottwald [2000] , but no comprehensive Gentzen-style proof-theoretic approach has yet been forthcoming. Progress for individual logics has varied. L, despite being explored thoroughly from a semantic perspective (see, e.g., Cignoli et al. [1999] ), only has calculi that either fail to be analytic (i.e., cut-free) [Prijatelj 1996] or internal (i.e., avoiding nonlogical calculations) [Hähnle 1993; Mundici and Olivetti 1998; Olivetti 2003] . A notable exception is the work of Aguzzoli, Ciabattoni, and Gerla [Aguzzoli and Ciabattoni 2000; Aguzzoli and Gerla 2002] , who gave cut-free internal calculi for L, G, and . However these calculi are both unsuitable for proof search and, being based on the semantics of particular finite-valued logics, do not cohere well with calculi for other logics. For G the proof-theoretic picture is more healthy; there are several (quite complicated) sequent calculi, for example, Dyckhoff [1999] and Avron and Konikowska [2001] , a calculus employing sequents of relations [Baaz and Fermüller 1999] , and also a very natural • G. Metcalfe et al. formulation using hypersequents [Avron 1996 ]. Hypersequent calculi, introduced independently by Avron [1987] and Pottinger [1983] as a generalization of sequent calculi, have also been given for MTL [Baaz et al. 2004] and IMTL [Ciabattoni et al. 2002] . A first (semantics-based) calculus for BL has been presented in Montagna et al. [2003] .
Analytic proof calculi for logics are not only an important theoretical tool, useful for understanding relationships between logics and proving metalogical properties like decidability, complexity, admissibility of rules, and interpolation, but also the key to potential applications. Proof-search algorithms can be used as the basis for "inference engines" in artificial intelligence for (fuzzy) knowledge representation, and reasoning in contexts of uncertainty and vagueness, for example, for tasks such as query-answering, consistency checking, abduction, or revision. For such applications, analytic proof methods are crucial, being not only good candidates for automated proof-search, but also, since they proceed by a stepwise decomposition of formulae, facilitating an understanding of proofs and allowing the extraction of explanatory information.
The approach taken in this work toward developing proof theory for fuzzy logics is new. It results from the identification of fuzzy logics with fragments of comparative logics. Intuitively, a fuzzy logic with truth values between 0 and 1 may be viewed as embedded in an "extended" logic with truth values between −∞ and +∞. These extended logics are called comparative logics 2 here to distinguish them from fuzzy logics with truth values in [0, 1] . The idea proposed in this article is that (at least in some cases) comparative logics are more natural to work with for proof-theoretic purposes. Developing proof systems for comparative logics then allows us to exploit our embeddings to obtain proof systems for their fragments. In fact, this mirrors the strategy of systems with extra relation symbols or labels; calculations are performed in an extended language to find answers for queries in the original language. The novelty is that the strategy is followed at the logical rather than at the metalogical level.
We apply this approach here to L, the appropriate comparative logic being Abelian logic A, the logic of lattice-ordered Abelian groups with characteristic models in the integers, rationals, and reals. A was introduced and motivated independently by Meyer and Slaney [1989] as a relevance logic, and Casari [1989] as a comparative logic. In Meyer and Slaney [1989] , by the so-called "enthymematic fragment" of A was proved to coincide exactly with L + , a positive part of L, and in this article we extend this result to identify the "material fragment" of A with the whole of L. A further, perhaps more natural, translation from L into A is also provided. By introducing analytic sequent and hypersequent calculi for A, we are then able to derive corresponding calculi for L.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we introduce L and A, and in Section 3 we relate the logics via two embeddings of L into A. We then turn our attention 2 The expression comparative logic was used by Casari [1989] to characterize systems formalizing ideas expressed by Aristotle on comparisons of majority, minority, and equality in natural language. There is considerable overlap between Casari's comparative logics and those presented here but whereas Casari regards fuzzy logics such as L as particular instances of comparative logics, this work instead presents fuzzy logics as their fragments.
to proof theory. In Section 4 we present hypersequent calculi for A and L, and in Section 5 we introduce terminating versions of these calculi. In Section 6 we introduce labeled calculi for A and L, which we show to be co-NP. Finally, in Section 7, we present unlabeled sequent calculi for A and L. 3
BACKGROUND
In this section we first present some syntactic preliminaries, then introduce Lukasiewicz logic L and Abelian logic A.
Preliminaries
We start with some basic definitions regarding propositional languages.
Definition 2.1. A propositional language L consists of a denumerable set of propositional variables VAR(L) with typical members p, q, r, p 1 , p 2 , . . . , and a finite set of connectives CON(L) = {# 1 , . . . , # n } with arities given by a function AR(L) : CON(L) → N, taken from the set
Definition 2.2. The set of well-formed formulae FOR(L) for a propositional language L is defined as the smallest set satisfying
To define what it means for a formula to be valid in an algebra, we exploit the fact that in this article we use the same symbol for both an algebraic operation and the corresponding logical connective.
Definition 2.3. A valuation v for an algebra A with universe L and operations CON(L) for some language L is a function v : VAR(L) → L extended to FOR(L) as follows:
Definition 2.4. We define the complexity of a formula for a language L as follows:
(1) cp( p) = 1 for p ∈ VAR(L).
3 Some of the results presented in Sections 6 and 7 have already appeared in Metcalfe et al. [2002] .
• G. Metcalfe et al.
Lukasiewicz Logic
Lukasiewicz logic L was introduced for philosophical reasons by Lukasiewicz in 1930 [ Lukasiewicz and Tarski 1930] . Good references for historical details and an overview of the main results are Malinowski [1993] and Urquhart [1986] . An in-depth algebraic treatment of L is provided by Cignoli et al. [1999] , and the fuzzy logic perspective is described in Hájek [1998] .
Definition 2.5. L is based on a language with connectives ⊃ and ⊥, and consists of the following axioms and rules:
Other connectives are defined as follows:
The following axiomatization for a positive fragment of L was given by Rose and Rosser [1958] .
Definition 2.6. L + is based on a language with connectives ⊇, ∨, ∧ and t, and consists of the rule (mp) and the following axioms:
Algebraic structures for L were introduced by Chang [1958] .
Definition 2.7. An MV-algebra is an algebra A, ⊕, ∼, ⊥ with a binary operation ⊕, a unary operation ∼and a constant ⊥, satisfying the following equations:
We (1, a+b) , ∼ a = 1−a, and ⊥ = 0. We have that [0, 1] 
. It will be convenient for us to also consider the MV-algebra [−1, 0] 
In fact either of these algebras is characteristic for MV-algebras. THEOREM 2.8 (CHANG 1958) . The following are equivalent:
Finally we mention the following complexity result for L. THEOREM 2.9 (MUNDICI 1987) . The tautology problem for L is co-NPcomplete.
Abelian Logic
Abelian logic A was introduced and investigated by Meyer and Slaney [1989] as a logic of relevance, obtained from Anderson and Belnap's relevant logic R (see Anderson and Belnap [1975] for details) by rejecting the contraction axiom
A has also been motivated independently by Casari [1989] as a logic of comparison formalizing comparisons of majority, minority, and equality in natural language. More recently Galli et al. [2004] have derived A as a logic of equilibrium for arguments. Finally, we note that a sequent calculus for the intensional fragment of A (the logic of Abelian groups) has been provided by Paoli in [2001] .
We begin here with an axiomatization for A.
Definition 2.10. A is based on a language with connectives →, +, ∧, ∨, and t, and consists of the following axioms and rules:
We also define: ¬A = def A → t.
Appropriate algebras for A are lattice-ordered Abelian groups, or for short, Abelian l-groups:
Definition 2.11. An Abelian l-group is an algebra G, +, ∨, ¬, t with binary operations + and ∨, a unary operation ¬, and a constant t, satisfying the following equations:
Well-known examples of Abelian l-groups are the integers Z = Z, +, max, −, 0 , the rationals Q = Q, +, max, −, 0 , and the reals R = R, +, max, −, 0 . In fact, any of these serves as a characteristic model for A.
THEOREM 2.12. The following are equivalent:
(1) A is a theorem of A.
(2) |= A A i.e. A is valid in all Abelian l-groups.
(3) A is valid in R (or Z or Q).
PROOF. The equivalence of (2) and (3) is well known from pure mathematics (see, e.g., Gurevich and Kokorin [1963] ). The equivalence of (1) and (2) is proved by Meyer and Slaney [1989] ; also given there is a more logic-minded proof of the equivalence of (2) and (3).
Notice that in A we have a + b = ¬(¬a + ¬b), that is, intensional disjunction and intensional conjunction are exactly the same thing. Similarly we have that t = ¬t, so truth and canonical falsity are also identical.
The complexity of the tautology problem for A follows directly from the following theorem.
THEOREM 2.13 [Weispfenning 1986 ]. The word problem for Abelian l-groups is co-NP-complete.
COROLLARY 2.14. The tautology problem for A is co-NP-complete.
RELATING A AND L
The use of Abelian l-groups in the theory of Lukasiewicz logic is not new. For example, in Chang's [1958] algebraic completeness proof, Abelian l-groups are constructed from MV-algebras, and in the Kripke-style semantics provided independently by Scott [1974] and Urquhart [1986] , Abelian l-groups are used to define satisfiability for formulae of L. Moreover in Cignoli et al. [1999] , it was shown that there is a natural equivalence between the categories of MValgebras and Abelian l-groups. It is not surprising, therefore, that the logic of Abelian l-groups should be related to L in some way. Here we give both an embedding of L into A which mirrors relationships between other logics investigated by Meyer and coworkers, and a translation from L into A which will prove useful later in deriving calculi for L.
We begin by defining two new connectives, the "enthymematic" implication ⊇ and the "material" implication ⊃.
Meyer [1973] showed that fragments obtained using these new implications frequently correspond to other well-known logics; for example, the material and enthymematic fragments of the relevance logic R are classical logic and positive intuitionistic logic, respectively. Of particular interest for fuzzy logics is the fact, demonstrated by Dunn and Meyer [1971] , that G is the material fragment of the relevance logic RM. We now investigate the corresponding fragments for A, noting that, since A has no falsity constant, ⊥ is treated as a propositional variable. Definition 3.3. A E consists of the theorems of A in the language built up from propositional variables t, ∧, ∨, and ⊇.
Definition 3.4. A M consists of the theorems of A in the language built up from propositional variables ⊥ and ⊃. Meyer and Slaney [1989] have shown that the enythmematic fragment of A is L + ; here we generalize this result to identify the material fragment of A with the whole of L. PROOF. L ⊆ A M . It is straightforward if laborious to check that all the (translated) axioms of L are valid in R; so it remains to show that (mp) is admissible.
If the former then clearly |= A B; if the latter then we have
for all propositional variables p. We claim that for all formulae B:
We would then have v (A) = v(A) < 0 as required. We prove the claim by induction on the complexity of B. The base case holds by stipulation.
We now give a less general but possibly more intuitive translation of L into A. The idea is to restrict the valuations of atoms in A to lie between t and an arbitary fixed propositional variable q ⊥ that acts as falsity. The Lukasiewicz implication (replacing ⊃ by ⇒ from now on) is defined in A as follows:
Before continuing we note that ∧ and ∨ can be interpreted using only ⇒ and the intensional connectives:
Our new translation of L into A is as follows: THEOREM 3.9. Let q ⊥ be an arbitary fixed propositional variable, and define
The base cases for propositional variables and ⊥ follow by definition, and for ⇒ we have that 
HYPERSEQUENT CALCULI
Hypersequent calculi were introduced independently by Avron [1987] and Pottinger [1983] for some nonclassical logics with a reasonably simple semantics but lacking a correspondingly simple sequent calculus. Hypersequents consist of a multiset of components (sequents) interpreted disjunctively, and hypersequent rules include, in addition to sequent rules, external structural rules that can operate on more than one component at a time. Hypersequent calculi are particularly suitable for logics obeying prelinearity, that is, where
is a theorem of the logic, since the multiple components of the hypersequent allow alternative hypotheses to be processed in parallel. All t-norm-based logics have prelinearity and this suggests that the hypersequent formalism could provide a suitable framework for a systematic proof theory of fuzzy logics; indeed, natural and intuitive hypersequent calculi have already been provided for G [Avron 1991] , MTL [Baaz et al. 2004] , and IMTL [Ciabattoni et al. 2002] .
i is an ordered pair of multisets of formulae (i.e., a sequent) called a component of the hypersequent.
Note that we choose components to consist of pairs of multisets of formulae and hypersequents to consist of multisets of components and therefore avoid the need in our calculi for internal and external exchange rules. In what follows, all set terminology ∪, ∩, {}, and so on will therefore refer to multisets unless otherwise stated.
A Hypersequent Calculus for A
Sequents and hypersequents for A are interpreted as follows, recalling that intensional conjunction and intensional disjunction are equivalent in this logic:
We introduce the following hypersequent calculus for A, using G, G 1 , G 2 , etc. as metavariables to denote (possibly empty) hypersequents called sidehypersequents.
Definition 4.3. GA has the following axioms and rules:
Axioms:
Structural rules:
Alternative rules to replace (∧, l ) and (∨, r) are
We could also replace the rules (M ), (EW ), (t, l ), and (t, r), and the axioms (ID) and ( ), with the single axiom
We now turn our attention to proving the soundness and completeness of GA, using the conventions of writing
PROOF. We reason inductively on the height of a proof in GA showing that the axioms and rules are sound in R, disregarding side-hypersequents by Proposition 4.5:
Other structural rules are similar.
-Logical rules. We just consider the rules for →, other cases being similar.
For
We prepare for our completeness proof by proving some simple properties of GA.
is derivable in GA.
PROOF. By induction on the size of , | |. If = ∅ then we apply ( ). Otherwise = {A} ∪ and we apply (M ) to obtain A A, which is derivable by (ID), and , which is derivable by the induction hypothesis.
To show that the process of applying logical rules terminates, we define the following complexity measures and orderings:
Definition 4.8. The complexity of sequents and hypersequents is defined as follows:
Definition 4.9. For multisets of integers and , < m iff
For multisets of multisets of integers and , < mm iff
Note that < m and < mm are well-orders on multisets of integers and multisets of multisets of integers, respectively.
PROPOSITION 4.10. The logical rules of GA terminate with atomic hypersequents.
PROOF. It is easy to see that all the logical rules strictly reduce the complexity of a hypersequent with respect to the ordering < mm , and that for any nonatomic formula there is always a logical rule that can be applied.
Definition 4.11. A rule is complete iff whenever the conclusion of the rule is valid then all its premises are valid. PROOF. As an example we show that (∧, l ) is complete, making use of Proposition 4.5 to ignore side-hypersequents.
We now show that proving an atomic hypersequent in GA is equivalent to solving a linear programming problem over R.
PROPOSITION 4.13. For atomic i and i , i = 1, . . . , n, the following are equivalent:
This holds in turn iff the set of polynomials 1 > 1 , . . . , n > n is inconsistent over R, which by linear programming methods is equivalent to (2) (see, e.g., Schrijver [1987] ). Now if (3) holds then by the soundness of GA clearly (1) and therefore (2) hold, so it remains to show that (2) implies (3). We proceed as follows, giving a proof of 1 1 | . . . | n n in GA. For each i, if λ i = 0 then we apply (EW) to remove i i from the hypersequent, otherwise we apply (EC) λ i − 1 times to obtain λ i copies of i i . We then apply (S) repeatedly to obtain the hypersequent
which, since the two sides are identical, is derivable by Proposition 4.7.
We are now ready to prove the completeness of GA.
PROOF. We assume that |= A G and give a proof of G in GA. Our first step is to apply the logical rules exhaustively to G. Since these rules are both terminating and complete by Propositions 4.10 and 4.12, respectively, we obtain hypersequents that are both valid and atomic, and hence, by Proposition 4.13, also derivable in GA.
We note finally that by Theorem 4.14 the following cut rules are admissible in GA:
In fact these are interderivable in GA:
A Hypersequent Calculus for L
We derive a hypersequent calculus for L from GA in several stages. First we give an interpretation for hypersequents for L in terms of the characteristic model [−1, 0] L . This allows us to give a natural translation from hypersequents for L to hypersequents for A. We then immediately have a hypersequent calculus for L using GA, which we can refine to obtain a more direct and natural calculus. We start by extending the standard notion of validity for L from |= L to |= * L using the characteristic model [−1, 0] L . A formula is interpreted as usual for this model but multisets of formulae are interpreted (as for A) as sums of elements in R (as opposed to bounded sums using the Lukasiewicz disjunction ⊕).
Interpretations are extended to sequents and hypersequents in the usual way.
Definition 4.15. |= * L 1
We emphasize that for formulae this notion coincides with the standard notion of validity for L. Hypersequents for L can also be interpreted in A. Theorem 4.17 means that we have a calculus for L simply by using GA applied to formulae of the form A * . We now refine this calculus in several steps.
Definition 4.18. GA * consists of the axioms and structural rules of GA together with the following logical rules:
PROOF. It is easy to check that the logical rules of GA * are derivable using the logical rules of GA and are hence complete. Since they also reduce a hypersequent G * to atomic hypersequents and the two calculi share the same structural rules and axioms, the result follows.
Our next move is to define a calculus that is stronger than GA * and operates directly on formulae of L rather than on their translations:
Definition 4.20. G L i consists of the axioms and structural rules of GA and the following logical rules:
PROOF. First we observe that removing the left premises from (⊥ * , r) and (q * , l ) and (q * , r) gives a calculus GA * 1 such that if G * is derivable in GA * then G * is derivable in GA * 1 . We now replace (for the calculus GA * 1 ) q by q * in the rules (q * , l ) and (q * , r) and q ⊥ by ⊥ * in the rules (⊥ * , l ) and (⊥ * , r) to obtain a calculus GA * 2 . Since no rules have conclusions with formulae that must be atomic, we have that if G * is derivable in GA * 1 then G * is derivable in GA * 2 . But this is the translation of G L i (removing (⊥ * , r) as it is just the trivial rule), so we have that if G * is derivable in GA * 2 then G is derivable in G L i , and we are done.
We now present our final calculus for L:
Definition 4.22. G L has the following axioms and rules: Axioms:
Example 4.23. We illustrate G L with a proof of ( L3):
We prove soundness and completeness proof-theoretically. PROOF. For (WL) we note that all formulae A * are of the form B ∧ t and proceed as follows:
For (⊥) we proceed by induction on the complexity of A. If A is a propositional variable p then we have
If A = ⊥ then we have an instance of (ID). For A = B ⇒ C, we have the following situation:
But now since (WL) is derivable in GA, we can step to t ∧ q ⊥ C * for the right branch, which is derivable by the induction hypothesis.
(⇒, l ) and (⇒, r) are derived as follows:
PROPOSITION 4.25. The following rule is admissible in G L:
PROOF. By induction on the height h of a proof of G| 1 ⊥, 1 | . . . | n ⊥, n . If h = 0 then we must have ⊥ ⊥ and we get ⊥ A by (⊥). The cases for h > 0 follow easily from the induction hypothesis. PROOF. For the left-to-right direction, we simply note that by Proposition 4.24 we have that the translations of all the rules of G L are either rules of GA or derivable in GA for hypersequents containing only formulae of the form A * .
For the right-to-left direction by Propositions 4.21 and 4.19, we only have to show that if G is derivable in G L i then G is derivable in G L. We simply note that all the extra rules of G L i are either derivable or admissible in G L by Proposition 4.26. 
Finally we note that by disregarding the rule (⊥) and adding the usual rules for ∧ and ∨ (e.g., those for GA), we obtain a calculus for L + .
TERMINATING HYPERSEQUENT CALCULI
GA and G L are appealing on the grounds of elegance but are not really suited to proof search. Most obviously, they are nonterminating due to the presence of the external contraction rule (EC). Here we obtain terminating calculi by replacing (EC) and (S) with new rules that apply external contraction and splitting more carefully. In particular, we deal with atoms one at a time by nominating an atom to be the focus of a hypersequent, the focus being changed only when all occurrences of the current focus have been removed from the hypersequent.
Definition 5.1. A focused hypersequent is a structure [q]G where G is a hypersequent, q an atom, and [q]G is valid for a logic iff G is valid for that logic.
A Terminating Hypersequent Calculus for A
We present the following terminating hypersequent calculus for A.
Definition 5.2. GA t consists of the axioms, logical rules, and structural rules (EW) and (M ) of GA with focused hypersequents and the same focus for premises and conclusion, and also (F ) [
where q occurs in G, p doesn't occur in G,
where G, 1 , 2 , 1 , and 2 are atomic n > 0, m > 0, p ∈ 1 ∪ 1 ∪ 2 ∪ 2 Sis 1 , np 1 or 2 mp, 2 . , Let us see why this calculus terminates. Clearly the logical rules reduce any hypersequent to a set of atomic hypersequents in the usual way (the other rules being inapplicable to nonatomic hypersequents). The proof then focuses on a particular atom, say q. (M ) and (ID) are used to remove atoms that occur on both sides of a component, then (R) is applied to pairs of components where the number of qs is higher on the left for one, and on the right for the other. Since each component has a difference between the number of qs on each side, and (R) reduces the sum of differences for the whole hypersequent, this process is terminating for a particular atom q. [q]2 p 3q, r|q, r p|2q p (R).
We now show formally that GA t is terminating using the following measure.
Definition 5.4. Given a hypersequent G =
where count( , p) = def | p | p ∈ |.
PROPOSITION 5.5. If the conditions
(1) G, 1 , 2 , 1 and 2 are atomic, PROOF. If S = 1 , np 1 then we have that
The case where S = 2 mp, 2 is symmetrical.
THEOREM 5.6. GA t terminates for [ p]G.
PROOF. We proceed by induction on (c, n, d , s) ordered lexicographically where c is the multiset complexity of G not including atoms, n is the number of different atoms occurring in [ p]G (including p), d is d ([ p]G), and s is the number of symbols in G. We show that all the rules (read backward) strictly reduce (c, n, d , s) . The logical rules all strictly reduce c, so we turn our attention to the structural rules. If (F ) is applied to [ p]G to give [q]G then obviously c is not increased, and since p doesn't occur in G and q does occur in G, n is strictly reduced. (R) does not increase c or n and by Proposition 5.5 strictly reduces d . Finally, (EW) and (M ) do not increase c, n, or d and strictly reduce s.
We now check that GA t is sound and complete.
PROOF. We simply observe that (R) is a derived rule of GA.
Although (R) is not complete, we have that if its conclusion is valid then its premise is valid for one of the choices for S. PROPOSITION 5.8. If |= A G| 1 1 | 2 2 then one of the following hold:
which gives, again by Proposition 4.13, that |= A G| 1 , 2 1 , 2 | 2 2 . The case where λ 1 ≥ λ 2 is symmetrical. Now consider a valid hypersequent G where for a given propositional variable p there are never more occurrences of p on the right of a component of G than the left. If we remove a component where p occurs more on the left than the right then we obtain a valid hypersequent G . PROPOSITION 5.9. Given an atomic hypersequent G = 1 1 | . . . | n n where |= A G and count( 1 , p) > count( 1 , p) and count( i , p) ≥ count( i , p) for i = 2, . . . , n then |= A 2 2 | . . . | n n . PROOF. By Proposition 4.13 |= A G iff there exist λ 1 , . . . , λ n ∈ N such that
, a contradiction. Hence λ 1 = 0 and by Proposition 4.13 we have |= A 2 2 | . . . | n n . Our completeness proof proceeds along the same lines as that for GA.
PROOF. If |= A G then by applying the (complete) logical rules to [ p]G we get valid atomic hypersequents. It remains to show then that all valid atomic hypersequent [ p]G are provable. We proceed by induction on (n, d ) where n is the number of propositional variables in G and d is d ([ p]G ). If n = 0 then [ p]G is an instance of ( ) and we are done. For n > 0 if d = 0 then we apply (M ) and (ID) until there are no occurrences of p left in the hypersequent and use (F ) to decrease n. If d > 0 then for some component 1 1 either  count( 1 , p) > count( 1 , p) or count( 1 , p) > count( 1 , p) 
A Terminating Hypersequent Calculus for L
A terminating hypersequent calculus for L is developed in a similar way to GA t .
Definition 5.11. G L t consists of the axioms, logical rules, and structural rules (WL), (EW), and (M ) of G L with foccused hypersequents and the same focus for premises and conclusion, and also the rules (F ) and (R) of GA t . THEOREM 5.12. G L t is terminating.
PROOF. Similar to the proof of Theorem 5.6. Just observe that (WL) does not increase the complexity of G not including atoms, the number of different atomic variables, or d ([ p]G), and strictly reduces the number of symbols of G.
THEOREM 5.13. If [ p]G is derivable in G L t then |= * L G. PROOF. (R) is a derived rule of G L, so we are done.
Completeness for G L t is proved in the same way as for GA t replacing Proposition 5.9 with the following result. Note that for convenience we call formulae of the form q * where q is atomic, starred atoms.
PROPOSITION 5.14. Given a hypersequent G = 1 1 | . . . | n n containing only starred atoms where |= A G and count( 1 , p * ) > count( 1 , p * ) and count( i , p * ) ≥ count( i , p * ) for i = 2, . . . , n then |= A 1 − {p * } 1 | 2 2 | . . . | n n . PROOF. G is valid iff the atomic hypersequents obtained by applying the ∧ and ∨ rules of GA to the starred atoms of G are valid. But these atomic hypersequents meet the conditions of Proposition 5.9, so we can remove the components containing a p resulting directly from the component 1 1 . The resulting hypersequents are valid and therefore so is the hypersequent
PROOF. Let GA * t be the calculus G L t with formulae A replaced everywhere with A * and the requirements for atoms in the structural rules changed to requirements for starred atoms. We have that if [ p]G * is derivable in GA * t then [ p]G is derivable in G L t . If |= * L G then by Proposition 4.17 we get |= A G * .
[p]G * is shown to be derivable in GA * t , imitating the proof of Theorem 5.10. We just note that Propositions 5.8 and 5.5 hold when applied to starred atoms and that Proposition 5.9 can be replaced by Proposition 5.14.
LABELED CALCULI
One drawback of our hypersequent calculi from a computational perspective is that applying complete rules to occurrences of ∧ and ⇒ on the left, and ∨ on the right, multiplies the number of components in a hypersequent exponentially. Here we give a method for tackling this problem using labels. We represent a disjunction of several unlabeled components (i.e., a hypersequent) as a single labeled sequent and give rules that operate on all components simultaneously. The labels themselves are built up from a unit label 1 and atomic labels x 1 , x 2 , . . ., and each labeled formula in a sequent consists of a label and a formula. Unlabeled components are obtained from labeled sequents via labeling functions that map each label into the set {0, 1}, removing formulae labeled with a 0 from the sequent and leaving those labeled with a 1. For example, the sequent x : p, 1 : q 1 : p, x : q is mapped by a labeling function f to q p if f (x) = 0 and to p, q p, q if f (x) = 1, the corresponding hypersequent being q p| p, q p, q.
The following definitions make these notions precise:
Definition 6.1. The set of labels Lab is generated from a set of atomic labels {x i } i∈N as follows:
(1) 1 ∈ Lab and x i ∈ Lab for all i ∈ N.
(2) If x ∈ Lab and y ∈ Lab then x y ∈ Lab.
We also define the following: -A labeled formula is of the form x : A where x ∈ Lab and A is a formula. -A labeled sequent is an ordered pair of multisets of labeled formulae, .
We also define f ( ) = {A | x : A ∈ and f (x) = 1} and f ( ) = f ( ) f ( ).
A Labeled Calculus for A
We interpret a labeled sequent S for A as the disjunction of all the unlabeled sequents obtained by applying labeling functions to S. 
where S is valid in a logic iff φ S is valid in that logic.
Observe that validity for labeled sequents coincides with the usual notion of validity |= A for sequents where all formulae are labeled with a 1. PROPOSITION 6.4. For multisets of formulae , , |= A l l iff |= A .
PROOF. Immediate from Definition 6.3.
We now present our labeled calculus for A. Note that recalling Proposition 3.8, we choose ⇒ as a primitive connective and define A ∧ B = def A + A ⇒ B and A ∨ B = def (B ⇒ A) → A, first because the rules for ⇒ are more uniform than those for ∧ and ∨ (and, looking ahead to Section 7, the rules for ∧ and ∨ for the unlabeled calculus do not even obey the subformula property) and second because we wish to exploit similarities with L.
Derived rules for ∧ and ∨ are
Example 6.7. The following example shows that more than one labeling function may be required for (AX) (noting that for convenience we write x for x1):
x y : r, zw : r, 1 : p, 1 : q 1 : r, x : p, x y : p, z : q, zw : q x y : r, z : q ⇒ r, 1 : p, 1 : q 1 : r, x : p, x y : p, z : q (⇒, l )
x y : r, 1 : q ⇒ (q ⇒ r), 1 : p, 1 : q 1 : r, x : p, x y : p (⇒, l )
where the top sequent is an instance of (AX) with labeling functions f 1 , and f 2 such that (AX) may be thought of as replacing the axioms and structural rules of GA; that is, interpreting each labeling function applied to the labeled sequent as a component, (AX) checks whether putting together any number of components (i.e., applying (EC) and (S)) gives a component of the form (derivable in GA using (M ) and (ID)). Note also that checking (AX) is equivalent to checking the inconsistency of the set of inequations { f ( ) > f ( ) | f a labeling function} over R, that is, to solving a linear programming problem.
We now consider the soundness and completeness of GA l . THEOREM 6.8. If S is derivable in GA l then |= A S.
PROOF. We reason by induction on the length of a proof in GA l and show that the logical rules and (AX) are sound in R.
-(AX). If is an instance of (AX ) then there exist labeling functions f 1 , . . . , f n and λ 1 , . . . , λ n ∈ N where λ i > 0 for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
-Logical rules. We consider (⇒, l ) as an example, other cases being similar. If |= A , x y : B x y : A, then given a valuation v we have that v( f ( )) + v( f (x y : B) ) ≤ v( f (x y : A)) + v( f ( )) for some labeling function f . For f (x y) = 0 we have v( f ( )) ≤ v( f ( )) so we take a labeling function f defined as f (z) = f (z) for z = x and f (x) = 0 and get v( f ( )) + v( f (x :
≤ v( f ( )). PROPOSITION 6.9. The logical rules of GA l are complete.
PROOF. We show that (⇒, l ) is complete as an example. If |= A , x : A ⇒ B then given a valuation v we have that v( f ( )) + v( f (x : A ⇒ B) ) ≤ v( f ( )) for some labeling function f . For f (x) = 0 we take f to be f extended with f ( y) = 0 and get v( f ( ))
and we take f to be f extended with f ( y) = 1. THEOREM 6.10. If |= A S then S is derivable in GA l .
PROOF. As in the proof of Theorem 4.14, we apply the complete (by Proposition 6.9) logical rules to S obtaining a set of valid labeled atomic sequents. We now show that all valid labeled atomic sequents are provable. We have that there are labeling functions f 1 , . . . , f n such that
We now turn our attention to showing that GA l is co-NP, the optimal bound for A. An apparent difficulty here is that checking whether a labeled sequent is an instance of (AX) is equivalent to checking the inconsistency of a set of equations of size exponential in the number of labels. However, as we demonstrate below, this set of equations can be transformed (in linear time) into a set of equations of size linear in the number of labels such that the new set is consistent iff the old set is consistent. First we introduce some new terminology. Definition 6.11. A labeled inequation is an expression where and are multisets of labeled formulae and ∈ {>, ≥}. For a labeling function f ,
Definition 6.13. A labeled inequation is label-regular iff the set of atomic labels occurring in the inequation together with 1 form a tree with root 1 and each label occurring in the inequation is a path from 1 to a node. Definition 6.14. Given a label-regular set of atomic labels, a maximal label is a child node of 1 in the tree.
The idea is that proofs in GA l generate labeled sequents of a particular form. Each new atomic label y is introduced in a proof as part of a complex label x y and will always occurs alongside x in subsequent labeled sequents in the proof. Definition 6.15. A proof sequence for a calculus is a sequence [S 1 , . . . , S n ] where (1) S i is the conclusion and S i+1 a premise of an instance of the rule of the calculus for i = 1, . . . , n − 1, (2) S 1 is an initial sequent of the calculus, and (3) S i is called a proof sequent of the calculus for i = 1, . . . , n. PROPOSITION 6.16. For a proof sequent of GA l , > is label-regular.
PROOF. Let S be a proof sequent of GA l . We proceed by induction on l , the length of a proof sequence for S. For l = 1 we have that S is an initial sequent of GA l that contains no atomic labels and is therefore label-regular. For l > 1 we consider the last rule application in the proof sequence. Since new labels are only introduced via the left premise of (⇒, l ), we just consider this rule. By the induction hypothesis we have that the inequation , x : A ⇒ B > is label-regular. Hence the atomic labels occurring in this inequation together with 1 form a tree and x is a path from 1 to a node w in this tree. If we now add the new atomic label y as a child node of w we obtain a tree where x y is a path from 1 to y, and all other paths are unaffected. Hence , x y : B > x y : A, is label-regular as required.
We now prove our main technical result. PROPOSITION 6.17. Given a set U such that
(1) U consists of m label-regular labeled inequations, (2) U contains n different atomic labels, and (3) no atomic label occurs in more than one labeled inequation in U .
We can find a set V in O(n) time such that
(1) V contains 2n + m unlabeled inequations,
PROOF. We proceed by induction on n. For n = 0, we take V = { ul ul | ∈ U } and we are done. For n > 0 we consider a label-regular inequation S ∈ U with an atomic label x that is a child node of 1, where S = , , with ∈ {>, ≥}, and and contain only labeled formulae in which x occurs and and contain only labeled formulae in which x does not occur. We define new labeled inequations:
where and are and with x removed from the labels in their labeled formulae, and q x is a new propositional variable. Let U = U − {S} ∪ {S 1 , S 2 , S 3 }. Notice that S 1 , S 2 , and S 3 are label-regular and that U has n − 1 labels. Also, since S is label-regular and x is a child node of 1, we have that atomic labels • G. Metcalfe et al. occurring in S 2 are descendents of x and hence cannot occur in S 1 . So by the induction hypothesis we can find U in O(n) time such that U is consistent iff V is consistent where V contains 2(n−1)+(m+2) = 2n+m unlabeled inequations.
It remains then to show that U is consistent iff U is consistent, defining = def < if is ≥, = def ≤ otherwise. For the left-to-right direction, suppose that U is inconsistent and consider a valuation v over R for the propositional variables occurring in U . We
for all labeling functions f , and hence since U is inconsistent (and other cases are trivial) we can extend g to get that v( g ( )) + v(q x ) v( g ( )). We further extend g with g (x) = 0 if v(q x ) = 0, g (x) = 1 otherwise, and get v( g ( )) + v( g ( )) v( g ( )) + v( g ( )) as required. For the right-to-left direction, suppose that U is inconsistent and consider a valuation v over R for the propositional variables occurring in U . Suppose (other cases being trivial) that we have a labeling function f such that
THEOREM 6.18. GA l ∈ co-NP PROOF. We give a nondeterministic algorithm to test whether an initial sequent S fails in GA l , showing that the length of a branch is bounded by O(n) where n is the length of S. The first part of the algorithm applies the logical rules of GA l exhaustively, terminating with a basic labeled sequent S = . Since S contains O(n) connectives and each logical rule strictly reduces the number of connectives, this process has O(n) steps. Moreover S has O(n) length and O(n) atomic labels. The second part of the algorithm checks whether S is an instance of (AX), that is, whether there are labeling functions f 1 , . . . , f m such that 
Since checking the latter is a linear programming problem known to be polynomial time, the result follows.
A Labeled Calculus for L
Labeled sequents for L are interpreted using the characteristic model [−1, 0] L .
for some labeling function f .
We also extend the translation * to labeled sequents.
Definition 6.20. Given a labeled multiset , * = {x : A * | x : A ∈ }. Given a labeled sequent S = , S * = * * . THEOREM 6.21. |= * L S iff |= A S * . PROOF. The proof of Theorem 3.9 is easily extended to labeled sequents.
To give a suitable axiom for a labeled calculus for L, we define a relation ⊆ * that takes account of internal weakening and ⊥. Definition 6.22. We define the relation ⊆ * recursively as follows:
(1)
We now present our labeled calculus for L.
Definition 6.23. G L l has the following axioms and rules:
Logical rules:
x : A ⇒ B, y a new atomic label
The soundness and completeness of G L l are proved using the translation * . PROPOSITION 6.24. S is derivable in G L l iff S * is derivable in GA l .
PROOF. Similar to (in fact easier than) the proof of Proposition 4.27. THEOREM 6.25. S is derivable in G L l iff |= * L S. PROOF. By Proposition 6.24 and Theorems 6.8, 6.10, and 6.21, respectively, we have that S is derivable in G L l iff S * is derivable in GA l iff |= A S * iff |= * L S. THEOREM 6.26. G L l is co-NP-complete.
PROOF. Similar to the proof of Theorem 6.18.
SEQUENT CALCULI
Perhaps surprisingly, we are also able to provide unlabeled sequent calculi for A and L. This is valuable both to provide an alternative perspective on the logics and also for proving proof-theoretic properties such as interpolation where an implicational interpretation is preferable. We proceed as follows. First, rather than labeling formulae or maintaining several components in a hypersequent, we make use of a rule that "contracts" an entire sequent n times from n n Example 4.4: A, A, B A, B, B, A  (M )   B, A, A A, B, B, B → A  (→, r) A → B, A, A B, B A → B, A, A B, B 
Soundness is proved in the usual way.
PROOF. We follow the standard inductive proof and just check soundness in R for the rules different from those of GA.
We take the opportunity here to prove some other useful properties of GA s . PROPOSITION 7.4. is derivable in GA s .
PROOF. An easy induction on the complexity of .
Definition 7.5. An inference rule is invertible if whenever the conclusion of the rule is derivable then the premises are derivable. PROPOSITION 7.6. The logical rules of GA s are invertible.
PROOF. We consider the rules for ⇒ as examples, other cases being similar.
,
, B, B ⇒ A A, (⇒, l ).
For (⇒, r) we prove the more general result that if n (A ⇒ B) , is derivable in GA s then and , nA nB, are derivable in GA s . We proceed by induction on h, the height of a proof of n (A ⇒ B) , . We assume n > 0, as otherwise the claim is trivial. If h = 0 then we have A ⇒ B • G. Metcalfe et al. A ⇒ B and A ⇒ B is derivable using (WL) and ( ), and A ⇒ B, A B is derivable using (⇒, l ), (WL), (M ), and (ID). For h > 0, we consider the last rule applied. The cases of (WL), (M ), (C), (⇒, r) with principal formula not A ⇒ B, and other logical rules, involve straightforward applications of the induction hypothesis. For (⇒, r) , if the principal formula is A ⇒ B then we apply the induction hypothesis with n − 1.
To prove the completeness of GA s , we show that any sequent derivable in the labeled calculus GA l is derivable in GA s , and then exploit the completeness of GA l . We introduce for this purpose an intermediate calculus GA i that performs proofs in GA l but also maintains a record of the formulae added by the (⇒, l ) rule for GA s ; sequents for GA i being of the form where and are multisets of labeled formulae, and is a multiset of unlabeled formulae called the store. By defining such a calculus, we are able to prove that if a proof sequent of GA i is derivable in GA l then the sequent ul , is derivable in GA s .
Definition 7.7. The rules for GA i are exactly the same as for GA l except that each premise and conclusion is replaced by , and (⇒, l ) becomes:
It is easy to see that formulae in the store are irrelevant to proofs in GA i .
PROOF. Wesimply observe that GA i and GA s have identical rules apart from the store which has no impact on proofs.
We now prove the main technical result for our completeness proof. The idea is that, at any point in a proof sequence of GA i , if we are given a labeling function f then we are able to divide the current sequent S into two parts; the first being the result of applying the labeling function to S, the second being a sequent derivable (without labels) in GA s . PROPOSITION 7.10 . Given a proof sequent of GA i and a labeling function f :
PROOF. By induction on l , the length of the proof sequence. If l = 1 then the only label is 1 and for every labeling function f , f ( ) = ul and f ( ) = ul , and is derivable in GA s by ( ). For l > 1, we consider the last rule application in the proof sequence. Below we treat the rules for ⇒, other cases being very similar: -(⇒, l ). By the induction hypothesis we have that which is derivable in GA s by Proposition 7.6. -(⇒, r). By the induction hypothesis we have that
is derivable in GA s . We want to know if
are derivable in GA s . For f (x) = 1, we have S = S and we are done. For f (x) = 0 we have that S 1 and S 2 are derivable by Proposition 7.6.
We use this proposition to give a correspondence between proofs in GA i and GA s . PROPOSITION 7.11 . If a proof sequent of GA i is derivable then ul , ul is derivable in GA s . PROOF. We proceed by induction on l , the length of the proof sequence for in GA i . For l > 0, we consider the last rule application in the proof. We obtain a shorter proof sequence for each premise, and by applying the induction hypothesis in each case we get premises that are derivable for the corresponding rule in GA s where the conclusion is exactly what we need. For l = 0, we have an instance of (AX); hence there are labeling functions f 1 , . . . , f n such that n i=1 f i ( ) = n i=1 f i ( ). We show that the corresponding sequent ul , ul is derivable in GA s . First we use (C) to step to ul , . . . , ul n , , . . . , n ul , . . . , ul n .
We now apply (M ) to obtain ul − f 1 ( ), . . . , ul − f n ( ), , . . . , n ul − f 1 ( ), . . . , ul − f n ( ), and f 1 ( ), . . . , f n ( ) f 1 ( ), . . . , f n ( ).
The first is derivable by repeated applications of (M ) and Proposition 7.10, the second by Proposition 7.4.
The completeness of GA s now follows easily.
q ⇒ q where appropriate). Now since the rules and axioms of GA s applying to ⇒ and propositional variables are a subset of those for G L s , we have that if S * is derivable in GA s , then S * is derivable in G L s . Hence we can then prove inductively that if S * is derivable in G L s then S is derivable in G L s , and we are done. THEOREM 7.16 . S is derivable in G L s iff |= * L S. PROOF. By Proposition 7.15, and Theorems 7.3, 7.12, and 4.17 , respectively, we have that S is derivable in G L s iff S * is derivable in GA s iff |= A S * iff |= * L S.
DISCUSSION
In this article, we have presented first Gentzen-style analytic sequent and hypersequent calculi for Abelian logic A and Lukasiewicz logic L. We have also developed terminating versions of the hypersequent calculi, and labeled calculi matching the complexity bounds for both logics. In the case of L, the key step in achieving these results has been a translation of L into A.
For A, our work extends Paoli's [2001] sequent calculus for the intensional fragment. For L, several proof systems have been presented in the literature but all either fail to be analytic (e.g., Prijatelj [1996] ), or rely on external nonlogical calculations such as solving mathematical programming problems [Hähnle 1993; Mundici and Olivetti 1998; Olivetti 2003 ]. An exception is the multiplesequent calculus of Aguzzoli and Ciabattoni [2000] , which exploits the fact that any formula valid in L is also valid in the finite-valued Lukasiewicz logic L n where n is a function of the number of occurrences of variables in the formula. Such calculi provide a valuable perspective on the connection between finite and infinite valued logics, but are not really suitable for proof search, and, being tailored to the semantics of the particular logic, do not cohere well with calculi for other families of logics.
Our labeled calculi may be understood as an efficient way of searching for proofs in the corresponding hypersequent calculi, providing a Co-NP decision procedure for A and L via a reduction to linear programming. Although for L this achievement is similar to that of Hähnle [1993] , the kind of reduction is essentially different. In Hähnle's tableau, a formula to be tested for satisfiability is decomposed to produce a mathematical programming problem, whereas in our calculi a proof of a labeled sequent is a tree whose nodes can be understood logically as hypersequents. Linear programming gives an efficient (co-NP) means for checking the success rule applied to leaves of the tree, but it is also in principle possible to check the rule using purely logical hypersequent rules. Implementation and experimental work is needed to verify which approach is more efficient. We also note that a further tableaux calculus has been provided for L by Olivetti in [2003] based on the Kripke semantics of L that again performs a reduction to mathematical programming problems and is co-NP.
Finally we note that our approach of embedding fuzzy logics in comparative logics could prove successful in deriving sequent and hypersequent calculi for other fuzzy logics. Indeed in recent work we have managed to define such
